Note: Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner by Spearing, Mary
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 3 | Number 1 Article 6
1974
Note: Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the
Tax-Exempt Owner
Mary Spearing
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Spearing, Note: Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner, 3 Fordham Urb. L.J. 123 (1974).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol3/iss1/6
LANDMARK PRESERVATION: THE PROBLEM
OF THE TAX-EXEMPT OWNER
Introduction
In 1965, the City Council of New York, in a move reflective of a
nationwide trend,' enacted the Landmark Preservation Act (Act)'
in order to secure the survival of New York City landmarks. The
Act, drafted with deference to aesthetic as well as legal principles,
authorizes the Mayor to create a Commission3 empowered to desig-
nate structures and districts in New York City as historic landmarks
and landmark areas.
This desire to preserve the physical "reminders" of the past, how-
1. For background materials and surveys of the issues raised by the
topic see Symposium-Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
309 (1971); Blumberg, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO
L. REV. 611 (1970); Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, 22 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. REV. 99 (1967); Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and
the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708 (1963). The
articles of Ada Louise Huxtable and Paul Goldberger, architecture critics
of the New York Times, provided a useful source of information for this
Note, in their coverage of the trend in the United States to preserve urban
landmarks. See N.Y. Times, July 15, 1974, at 24, col. 5; id., July 14, 1974,
at 83, col. 1; id., July 8, 1974, at 29, col. 2; id., July 2, 1974, at 34, col. 4;
id., June 29, 1974, at 28, col. 2; id., June 26, 1974, at 1, col. 4; id., June 9,
1974, at 107, col. 1; id., June 2, 1974, at 48, col. 4; id., Apr. 15, 1974, at 35,
col. 1; id., Mar. 23, 1974, at 34, col. 1; id., Mar. 20, 1974, at 45, col. 4.
2. Law of April 19, 1965, No. 46, [19651 N.Y. Local Laws 261 (codified
at NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0
(1971), as amended, [1973] N.Y. Local Law No. 71 [hereinafter cited as
Landmarks Act]. The Act was passed under the New York Historic Preser-
vation Enabling Act of 1956. Law of April 2, 1956, ch. 216, [1956] N.Y.
Laws 908, formerly codified as N.Y. GEN. Crrv LAW § 20(25-a) (McKinney
1968)). In 1968 the relevant provision of the original Enabling Act was
repealed and reenacted in substance as N.Y. GEN. MuNic. LAW § 96-a
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
3. The Commission consists of eleven members appointed for three
year terms, including architects, city planners, art historians, and real
estate consultants. Interview with Charles Bolet, Community Relations
Director of the Landmark Commission of New York City, in New York
City, Aug. 7, 1974.
4. Landmarks Act § 207-2.0.
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ever, has clashed with the individual's constitutional right to use
and control his own property.' As a practical matter, landmark
preservation-,laws fail to confront this conflict; litigation invariably
results. The effectiveness of the laws becomes increasingly ques-
•tionable with every demolition of another landmark and with each
uncompensated, deprived property owner. This Note will examine
the effectiveness of the Act in meeting this conflict, with particular
attention to the unprotected status of the tax-exempt property
owner.7
5. 1"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See, e~g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La.
1974); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d' 563 (1953);
Lutheran Church in America v. Landmarks Comm'n, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316
N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974),; Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App.
Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d,314 (1st Dep't 1968).
7. The legal ranifications'of landmark preservation have been the sub-
ject of thorough and exhaustive study in law reviews in the past ten years.
Historic district and preservation-laws in other cities have received exten-
sive attention by other writers. This-Note does nbt speak to the area in a
general way, nor does it deal with any preservation statutes other than the
New York City Landmarks Preservation Act. It focuses particularly on the
failure of the New York Act to provide viable alternatives for an uncom-
pensated charitable owner of an individual landmark site. Such a failure
warrants in-depth consideration because of the recent cases involving that
situation, notably the Lutheran Church's ownership of the J.P. Morgan
Mansion. See Lutheran Church in America v. Landmarks Comm'n, 35
N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974). The status of the tax-
exempt owner in. New York City has received only cursory attention. For
a broader analysis of the area see Blumberg, Legal Methods of Historic
Preservation,19-Br'FALo L. REV. 611 (1970); Boasberg, Washington Beat:
Historic Preservation-Some Practical Problems with the Federal Funding
Approach, 5- URBAN LAW. 749 (1973); Kramer, Proposed Guidelines for
Historic Preservation in Texas 5 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 61 (1973); Wolf, The
Landmark Problem in New York, 22 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 99 (1967);
Symposium-Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 309 (1971);
Symposium-Aesthetics vs. Free Enterprise, 15 PRAc. LAW. 17 (1969);
Note, Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Planning, 35 ALBANY L. REV.
126 (1970); Note, Land Use Controls in Historic Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 379 (1969); Note, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation for
Temporary Taking, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 362 (1968).
[Vol. III
NOTES
The Constitutionality of Landmark Preservation Laws
Landmark preservation laws closely resemble zoning ordinances
in that they constitutionally regulate real property.' The presump-
tion of validity and constitutionality of comprehensive zoning was
first established in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Euclid involved an
ordinance forbidding the construction of industrial establishments
in designated residential districts. While upholding the validity of
the ordinance, the Supreme Court considered whether the right to
property was violated by regulations promulgated under the guise
of the police power. The Court stated:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained,
a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected
as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . [I]n this there is no inconsistency, for
while the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.'0
The Court concluded that no fundamental right was violated, stat-
ing that zoning ordinances were constitutional unless clearly shown
to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and without a "substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."" After
Euclid, zoning laws were enacted in forty-five states. 2
While the Court established the validity of zoning in Euclid, it did
not discuss the possible aesthetic aspects of such regulation.,3 Since
Euclid, this issue has frequently been presented for judicial consid-
eration. Early decisions held that purely aesthetic considerations
were not sufficient to justify an invasion of an individual's property
rights, though aesthetics could be said to be an element of the
8. See generally R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACE (2d
ed. 1973).
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
10. Id. at 387.
11. Id. at 395. See also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928), where the Court struck down an ordinance similar to that in Euclid
on the grounds that it did not have the requisite relation to the public
health and welfare. Id. at 187.
12. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 165 (1959).
13. 272 U.S. at 386-90.
14. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
La. 1974); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955);
19741
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"general welfare."' 5 Later, in Berman v. Parker," the Supreme
Court broadened "general welfare" to include both spiritual and
aesthetic values:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it repre-
sents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled .... If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there
is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.'"
In People v. Stover, 8 the New York Court of Appeals included
aesthetics as an element to consider in zoning. Defendant home-
owner had placed a clothesline on his front lawn and hung old clo-
thing and rags as a protest against the city's high taxes. For the next
five years defendant continued adding clotheslines. Finally, the
city enacted an ordinance prohibiting, with exceptions, the placing
of clotheslines in a front or side yard abutting a street. In ruling
against the homeowner, the court held that aesthetic elements may
be considered by a legislative body in enacting laws designed to
promote health and safety." Although the court may have based its
Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932); Manhattan Club
v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
15. See, e.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 106-07 (1909); Dowsey v.
Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 230-31, 177 N.E. 427, 430 (1931).
16. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In this case, the District of Columbia Redevel-
opment Act of 1945, which empowered an administrative agency to redev-
elop a large area of the District of Columbia in order to eliminate slums
and substandard housing conditions, was held constitutional as applied to
the taking of appellant's building. The Court concluded that it was not
beyond the power of Congress to attack the problems of slums in the cities,
nor was it beyond Congress' power to authorize the taking of private prop-
erty as part of such a project. Id. at 34.
17. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
18. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed
for want of substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
19. Id. at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737. The New York
courts have found that the zoning power is derived from a specific grant
"but not for a purely aesthetic purpose designed for the maintenance or
development of the beautification of the city." Melita v. Nolan, 126 Misc.
345, 347, 213 N.Y.S. 674, 677 (1926). By 1931, however, the trend was one
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decision on property value considerations," Stover stands as an ap-
proval of aesthetic zoning allowable within the police power. The
New York City Landmarks Act was designed to balance the inter-
ests of those aesthetic values and the economic protection of indi-
vidual property owners. 2
The New York City Landmarks Preservation Act
The Landmarks Act is distinguished from other cities' preserva-
tion laws by the broad definitions of what it seeks to preserve.22 In
the Act's declaration of legislative purpose23 the City Council noted
that New York City's standing:
as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of business, culture and
government cannot be maintained or enhanced by disregarding the historical
and architectural heritage of the city and by countenancing the destruction
of such cultural assets.2'
The City Council's more general purposes included the protection
of property values in a district,25 the strengthening of the economy
of the city, and the promotion of the use of historic districts for the
education, pleasure, and welfare of the city's residents.
2 1
The Act defines an "historic landmark" as:
any improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a
special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of
the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or
nation and which has been designated as a landmark ....
of giving more credence to the concept of aesthetics. Judge Pound noted
that it was unnecessary to think of the aesthetic value in extremes:
"Beauty may not be queen but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of
protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under the wing of
safety, morality or decency." Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182
N.E. 5, 6 (1932).
20. 12 N.Y.2d at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
21. See notes 22-50 infra and accompanying text.
22. The preservation laws of other cities define more specifically in
stylistic terms the kind of architecture they aim to preserve. See Blumberg,
Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 611, 632
(1970).
23. Landmarks Act § 205-1.0.
24. Id. § 205-1.0(a).
25. See id. § 207-1.0(h).
26. Id. § 205-1.0(b).
27. Id. § 207-1.0(k).
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The designation of a structure as a landmark appears to be based
on architectural rather than historical criteria. 8 The Landmarks
Commission may designate a structure to be a landmark on the
basis of its own investigative initiative, though neighborhood resi-
dents or community groups usually make proposals regarding cer-
tain buildings. 9 Notice must be given of the required public hear-
ings where arguments for and against designation are made.'
In regulating the maintenance of structures granted landmark
status, the powers of the Landmarks Commission conflict with the
rights of the property owner. Although the Act originally limited the
powers of the Commission to regulation of the exteriors of buildings,
in 1973 the City Council enlarged the scope of regulation to include
interiors where public access is permitted .31 In this respect the Com-
mission may impose regulations more restrictive than otherwise pro-
vided by applicable law. The Act's'regulations apply to construc-
tion, alteration, demolition, or use of landmark property, or to the
performance of minor work thereon. 3 It is unlawful for any person
in charge34 of a landmark site to perform such work unless a certifi-
cate of appropriateness has been issued.35 When an applicant re-
quests a certificate, a public hearing is held, and the Commission
must act on the application within ninety days.38
Under the Act the owner of a landmark is entitled to earn a net
annual return of six percent of the value of his landmark property.
28. Interview with Charles Bolet, Community Relations Director of the
Landmark Commission of New York City, in New York City, Aug. 7, 1974.
29. Id.
30. Landmarks Act § 207-12.0(a).
31. Id. § 207-12.0(b). -
32. [19731 N.Y. Local Law No. 71.
33. Landmarks Act § 207-3.0(b).
34. Id. § 207-1.0(t) defines a person in charge as "[t]he person or
persons possessed of the freehold of an improvement or improvement par-
cel or a lesser estate therein, a mortgagee or vendee in possession, assignee
of rents, receiver, executor, trustee, lessee, agent or any other person di-
rectly or indirectly in control of an improvement or improvement parcel."
35. Id. § 207-16.0. Violators of the Act's regulations of construction,
alteration and demolition "shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
punished by a fine of [$100 to $1000] ... or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or by both. . ....
36. Id. § 207-8.0(g)(2).
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Most cases involve owners not realizing such a return. 7 If such an
owner establishes his inability to earn the six percent return and the
Commission denies him a certificate, the Act places upon the Com-
mission the burden of devising a plan whereby the landmark may
be preserved and rendered "capable of earning a reasonable re-
turn."" Such a plan may include, inter alia, a partial or complete
tax exemption, remission of taxes, or an authorization of alteration,
construction, or reconstruction consistent with the criteria of the
Commission. 9 The owner need not accept the plan, and if rejected,
the Commission may send the mayor a recommendation that the
City condemn the property.'"
These measures, enacted to ensure economic stability for land-
mark owners, are directed exclusively to the owner of taxed prop-
erty,4' and seem to have been effective in practice. The Act, how-
ever, is ineffective insofar as it fails to protect owners of non-taxed
property. The distinctions in the Act between owners of taxed prop-
erty and tax-exempt property have been challenged as unconstitu-
tional .
In order to acquire a certificate of appropriateness to permit alter-
ation or demolition on the ground of insufficient return, the owner
of a tax-exempt landmark must establish that he has entered into
an agreement to sell or lease the property, that the property is
incapable of earning a reasonable return, that it has become unsuit-
able for its intended purpose, and that the prospective purchaser or
tenant intends to alter or demolish the premises." If the tax-exempt
37. See notes 53, 67 infra and accompanying text.
38. See id. § 207-1.0(c). A valuation of the "reasonable return" shall
be "the current assessed valuation established by the city, which is in
effect at the time of the filing of the request for a certificate of
appropriateness . . . ." Id. § 207-1.0(v)(2).
39. Id. § 207-8.0(b).
40. Id. § 207-8.0(g)(1).
41. Id.
42. Interview with Charles Bolet, Community Relations Director of the
Landmark Commission of New York City, in New York City, August 7,
1974. See generally Landmarks Act § 207-8.0.
43. Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d
314 (1st Dep't 1968); see note 57 infra and accompanying text.
44. Owners of tax-exempt property must establish that: "(a) the
owner of such improvement has entered into a bonafide agreement to sell
an estate of freehold or to grant a term of at least twenty years in such im-
1974]
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property owner satisfies these requirements, the Commission must
find an alternate purchaser or tenant who will buy or lease without
a certificate of appropriateness.45 If the Commission fails to do so,
the owner may do as he wishes with the property.46 Almost without
exception, demolition of the landmark is the end result.47
The Lutheran Church Case
The problem presented to the owner of tax-exempt property who
wishes to retain the property in an altered form is raised in Lutheran
Church in America v. Landmarks Commission.48
The Lutheran Church in America has owned the J.P. Morgan
mansion since 1942."9 In November, 1965, over the Church's opposi-
tion, the Landmarks Commission designated it a landmark. 0 Sub-
sequently, the Church unsuccessfully5' attempted to obtain Com-
provement parcel, which agreement is subject'to or contingent upon the
issuance of the certificate of appropriateness or a notice to proceed; (b) the
improvement parcel which includes such improvement, as existing at the
time of the filing of such request, would not, if it were not exempt in whole
or in part from real property taxation, be capable of earning a reasonable
return; (c) such improvement has ceased to be adequate, suitable or appro-
priate for use for carrying out both (1) the purposes of such owner to which
it is devoted and (2) those purposes to which it had been devoted when
acquired unless such owner is no longer engaged in pursuing such purposes;
and (d) the prospective purchasers or tenant: (1) in the case of an applica-
tion for a permit to demolish seeks and intends, in good faith either to
demolish such improvement immediately for the purpose of constructing
on the site thereof with reasonable promptness a new building or other
facility; or (2) in the case of an application for a permit to make alterations
or reconstruct, seeks and intends in good faith to alter or reconstruct im-
provement, with reasonable promptness." Landmarks Act §§ 207-
8.0(a)(2)(a)-(d).
45. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(1).
46. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(4)(b).
47. Id. § 207-8.0(i)(5).
48. Lutheran Church in America v. Landmarks Comm'n, 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
49. Id. at 124, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
50. Id. The Church registered its official complaint: "It appears undis-
puted that plaintiff's office space requirements increased to such an ex-
tent that, even with the addition of a brick wing in 1958, the building
became totally inadequate." Id.
51. Id.
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mission permission to demolish the mansion and replace it with a
fifteen story office building to house its administrative offices. The
New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Church, and
granted permission to demolish the landmark structure. Finding a
"taking" without just compensation by the state, the court ruled
that the Church's economic hardship outweighed any intrinsic
merit in maintaining the structure for the general welfare.A2
Lutheran Church illustrates the statute's paucity of alternatives
for the owner of tax-exempt property. Because the tax rebate or
remission option is inapplicable, the owner of such tax-exempt
property who does not want to sell is faced with the prospect of being
forced to retain the property in its burdensome condition. The court
rejected this result as violative of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution and the corresponding sec-
tions in the New York State Constitution:53
What has occurred here . . where the commission is attempting to force
plaintiff to retain its property as is, without any sort of relief or adequate
compensation, is nothing short of a naked taking .... . [Tihe commission,
without any move toward invoking the power of eminent domain, is attempt-
ing to add this property to the public use by purely and simply invading the
owner's right to own and manage. Legitimate zoning stops far short of this
because it does-not appropriate to public use. Where the owner can make a
case for alteration or demolition the municipality would have to relinquish
the designation, provide agreeable alternatives or condemn the premises."
If the court of appeals is saying that the economic burden placed
upon the owner of the property voids the decision of the Landmarks
Commission, the full effectiveness of the Act could be in serious
jeopardy. It can be argued, however, that a reduction in value of the
church's property rights is not unconstitutional because the general
welfare of the people of New York is being enhanced by the unal-
tered presence of the mansion. New York courts have consistently
upheld the validity of zoning restrictions imposed in the public
52. Id. See generally Masotti & Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police
Power, 46 URBAN LAW. 773 (1969); Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Comment, Aesthetic Considerations and the Police
Power, 35 B.U.L. REV. 615 (1955); Comment, Landmark Preservation
Laws: Compensation for Temporary Taking, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 362 (1968).
53. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-7.
54. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
1974]
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interest,55 although they may result in a reduction in the value of
specific property.56 The court in Little v. Young57 stated:
For the benefit of all some of the public, when zoning was ordained by the
state, were destined to surrender some of their rights .... Properly adminis-
tered zoning power by local authorities may legally leave in its wake scars of
lost profits to land owners as well as restricted uses causing inconvenience
and disappointments but that is the exact meaning of zoning."
One might expect the zoning theory to apply with equal force in
instances of landmark preservation because landmark preservation
laws are similar in concept.5" The question remains, however, as to
what extent the public welfare may justify harm to a property
owner, without raising constitutional problems.
The Act requires a different showing of need for taxable and tax-
exempt property owners.6 0 In Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt,"' a char-
55. See, e.g., Palmer v. Furman, 283 App. Div. 664, 127 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2d
Dep't 1954); Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 67 Misc. 2d 828, 324 N.Y.S.2d
668 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 243 N.Y.S.2d
156 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Udell v. Haar, 21
N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); Little v. Young, 82
N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d
Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74, 86 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1949). A
municipality, as a general rule, does not have authority to spot zone, that
is, to arbitrarily place a specific piece of property in a different zone from
that of neighboring property. Santmyers v. Town of Oyster Bay, 10 Misc.
2d 614, 615, 169 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (Sup. Ct. 1957). However, since a city
generally has the power to rezone with respect to a small area, improper
spot zoning does not exist where there is no arbitrariness or unreason-
ableness. Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 231 S.C. 526, -, 99 S.E.2d
177, 180 (1957).
56. Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120, 210 N.Y.S. 941
(1925) (mem.).
57. 82 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 1005, 85 N.Y.S.2d
41 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 699, 87 N.E.2d 74, 86 N.Y.S.2d 288
(1949) (mem.).,
58. 82 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (citation omitted).
59. See notes 6-20 supra and accompanying text. See also Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); Shepard v.
Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949); Nappi v. La
Guardia, 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716, 54 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1945); Higbee v.
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320 (1940).
60. See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
61. 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 29 App. Div.
2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968).
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itable organization, whose concern was to provide housing for re-
tired seamen, wished to replace certain buildings with more modern
and adequate accommodations. It was argued that the Act's distinc-
tion between taxed and tax-exempt property constituted an unrea-
sonable discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
The trial court refused to rule on the constitutional question. 3 Al-
though the court stated that aesthetic and cultural benefits to the
community were an adequate basis for the exercise of the police
power, 4 it held for the charitable organization, finding that applica-
tion of the Act here exceeded the limits of reasonable regulation.65
In reversing, the appellate division set forth a standard for deter-
mining what constitutes an undue burden upon charitable organiza-
tions: the maintenance of a landmark must physically or financially
prevent or seriously interfere with the charitable purpose. 6
Other decisions, though not involving charitable institutions,
have upheld ordinances where more than mere financial hardship
is proven." New Orleans' preservation ordinance, the Vieux Carre
law, 6 is similar to the Act, and is intended to aid in the preservation
of the French and Spanish quarters of the city.6"
In Maher v. City of New Orleans,0 a federal district court examin-
ing the preservation ordinance found that the test of constitution-
ality is not whether detriment to the landmark owner outweighs the
benefits conferred on the public, but whether the ordinance goes so
far as to preclude use of the property for any purpose for which it
was reasonably adopted." The court stated that a "zoning ordi-
62. Id. at 936, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 77-78.
63. Id. at 936, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
64. Id. at 936, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
65. Id. at 937, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
66. 29 App. Div. 2d at 378, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
67. See Levitt v. Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501,
189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120,
210 N.Y.S. 941 (1925) (mem.); Setauket Dev. Corp. v. Romeo, 18 App. Div.
2d 825, 237 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1963).
68. New Orleans, La., Vieux Carre Ordinance 14538, Mar. 3, 1937 (en-
acted pursuant to LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 29).
69. Id.
70. 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
71. Id. at 662, citing Summersv. City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 309,
217 N.E.2d 663, 664, 270 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1966).
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nance, as an exercise of the police power, will almost always 'reduce
the value of rights of some individuals', but that does not make it
unconstitutional."72 According to the standards set in Maher and
Sailors' Snug Harbor, the property in Lutheran Church was practi-
cally unuseable and the organization was prevented from carrying
out its charitable purpose."
Conclusion
Single landmarks are rarely profitable, and perhaps a different
standard of value must be applied with respect to them. History
preserved is not often appreciated in an economic way with any
lasting success; the measure of appreciation therefore must be de-
termined by different and perhaps necessarily less legalistic
principles. The Act founders at this crucial juncture because it fails
to mesh the two conflicting goals of preservation and just compensa-
tion to property owners.
The right to property has a blessed heritage. As Lord Pitt re-
minded us: "The poorest man in his cottage could defy the King-
storms may enter-the rain may enter but the King of England
cannot enter." 7' But the rights so established are not absolute.
The question is whether the preservation of our history, as seen
through our architecture, is a laudable goal, worthy of imposing an
infringement on property rights without compensating the land-
owner.
The Landmarks Act was enacted to preserve our past; but the
answers to the legal issues unfortunately do not lie within the stat-
ute." Such a law, designed to protect the individual property owner
72. 371 F. Supp. at 662, citing Neef v. City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275,
282, 43 N.E.2d 947, 951 (1942).
73. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
74. C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING vii (1959).
75. There are alternatives to demolition not mentioned thus far in this
Note; those include air rights transfers, and specific protective interest on
the part of the city. See generally J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974). The
effectiveness of the Act may ultimately depend on the interest, in financial
terms, the city is willing to take in preserving its architecture. Alternatives,
such as a tax on the city's residents or condemnation of every building the
city finds worth preserving are subjects which are worthy of lengthy com-
ment in themselves.
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and the history of our city, will never work unless the community
and the courts decide that the community is being served by preser-
vation. The dissent in Lutheran Church supports such thinking:
[Tihis law [the Landmarks Act] leans heavily on economic reasons for its
justification as a valid exercise of the police power. But .. .in the main
the purposes sought to be achieved are aesthetic. Historic preservation pro-
motes aesthetic values by adding to the variety, the beauty and the quality
of life. Perhaps it is time that.aesthetics took its place as a zoning end
independently cognizable under the police power for "a high civilization
must ...give full value and support to the . . . great branches of man's
scholarly and cultural activity in order to achieve a better understanding of
the past, a better analysis of the present, and a better view of the future.""
Mary Spearing
76. 35 N.Y.2d at 134-35 n.4, 316 N.E.2d at 311 n.4, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 19
n.4 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis omitted), quoting the National Foun-
dation on the Arts- and Humanities Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1970).

